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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF RELIGION - COMPULSORY
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE LAW: STATE INTERESTS BALANCED AGAINST
BELIEFS OF MEMBERS OF THE AMISH FAITH - State v. Yoder, 49
Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971).
Defendants, members of the Old Order Amish religion and of the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, refused to enroll their chil-
dren, eighth-grade public school graduates, in public high school and
were subsequently convicted of violating the Wisconsin Compulsory
School Attendance Law.' The trial court held the attendance law to
be a reasonable exercise of a governmental function of the state even
though the law interfered with the defendants' sincere religious beliefs.
The convictions and assessments of fines were affirmed by the circuit
court. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. Held: The
Wisconsin Compulsory School Attendance Law, as applied to the
Amish, infringes upon their religious liberty and, because it serves no
compelling state interest, violates the free exercise clause of the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. State v. Yoder,
49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994
(1971).2
The Yoder decision, if upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
may be a turning point in the conflict between state interests and first
amendment rights of religious freedom.3 Earlier cases had denied the
1. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.77 (1966) provided in part:
(1)(a) [A] ny person having under his control a child between the ages of 7 and 16
years shall cause such child to attend some school regularly to the end of the school
term, quarter, semester or other division of the school year in which he is 16 years
of age, unless the child has a legal excuse, during the full period and hours, religious
holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child should be
enrolled is in session.
The Wisconsin statute was modified in 1970 but reads substantially the same as the act
under which the petitioners in Yoder were convicted. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (Supp.
1970).
2. For the precise wording of the issues to be examined see 40 U.S.L.W. 3028 (U.S.
July 13, 1971).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."
It is essential to note that the first amendment contains two limitations on Congres-
sional action affecting religion: Congress may make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, and Congress may make no law prohibiting the free exercise thereof. See
note 26 and accompanying text, infra.
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right of an individual to be exempt, for religious reasons, from statu-
tory compulsory education. The reasoning in these decisions is illus-
trated by Commonwealth v. Beiler4 and State v. Garber.5
In Beiler the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a con-
flict existed between the "competing demands ' 6 of the state compul-
sory education law and religous liberty. The problem was to deter-
mine which demand was paramount. 7 The court concluded that par-
ents have no constitutional right to deprive their children of education
or to prevent the state from preparing children "for the independent
and intelligent exercise of their privileges and obligations as citizens in
a free democracy."8 The "fundamental objectives"9 of the state are
paramount and do not actually conflict with religious liberty, since
without democracy religious liberty cannot exist. 10
State v. Garber,1 the most recent discussion of the Amish and
compulsory education before Yoder, held that the Kansas compulsory
education law12 was a valid exercise of the police power, despite its
acknowledged interference with the practice of the Amish religion.
4. 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134(1951).
5. 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
6. 79 A.2d at 136.
7. The Beiler court initially spoke in terms of its responsibility to "find a solution
which will reasonably accommodate both demands in a manner that will preserve the
essentials of each." Id. at 136. This language anticipated the balancing approach fol-
lowed in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). However, in assessing the "demands"
of religious liberty, the court was satisfied to adopt the familiar doctrine that religious
liberty encompasses an absolute right to believe but only a limited right to act. The deci-
sion summarizes the belief-conduct dichotomy as applied in cases involving the Mor-
mon, Seventh Day Adventist, Jewish, Mennonite and Jehovah Witness faiths. Beier, 168
Pa. Super. at 468, 469, 79 A.2d at 137. The dichotomy originated in Reynolds v. L nited
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statutory prohibition of polygamy does not infringe upon the
free exercise of the Mormon religion in that it only affects religious conduct and not re-
ligious belief) Some commentators feel that the distinction between conduct and belief
was abandoned in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause
protects distribution of religious literature). See, e.g., Casad, Compulsory High School
Attendance and the Old Order Ami.sh: A ConnentarY on State v. Garber, 16 KA-'. L.
REV. 423, 427 n.17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Casad]. However, the Beiler decision
shows that the distinction persisted, at least in the state courts, until Sherbert. The Sher-
bert Court rejected the idea that the dichotomy is a total solution to free exercise
problems.
8. Beiler, 79 A.2d at 134. This conclusion was adopted from Commonwealth v. Bey,
166 Pa. Super. 136, 70 A.2d 693 (1950).
9. Beiler, 79 A.2d at 134.
10. Beiler has since been modified by the Pennsylvania legislature. See Yoder, 182
N.W.2d at 546 n.10. The plan passed by the legislature provides for day schools oper-
ated by church groups for eighth-grade graduates. The school must provide a minimum
number of hours of instruction, with additional instruction in agricultural and domestic
projects. See also 53 VA. L. REv. 925, 951 (1967).
II. See note 5, supra.
12. KAN. S1 AT. ANN. § 72-4801 (1964). The Kansas legislature effectively overruled
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The court adopted the distinction between a right to believe and a
right to act,13 and concluded that the law was valid because it did not
infringe upon the right to worship or believe.' 4 The Garber decision
was couched in terms of "general principles"'15 and followed those
cases which have held that the state as parens patriae6 may restrict a
parent's control by enforcing laws enacted in the public interest.'7
The United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to re-
view the decision in Garber.18 Thus, the Court did not take the oppor-
tunity to determine whether the Kansas court erred in failing to apply
the "compelling interest" test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.19 In
Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment com-
pensation because she refused to accept work on Saturday, her Sab-
bath. The Court held the South Carolina statute unconstitutional as
applied to the petitioner because there was no "compelling state inter-
est"20 to justify the statute's eligibility provisions which infringed upon
her right to freely exercise her religion.21
the Garber decision by subsequent amendment of the Compulsory School Attendance
Law, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1970). The passage of this bill suggests that the
state conceded the lack of a "compelling state interest." See note 21 and accompanying
text, infra.
13. See note 7, supra.
14. Garber, 419 P.2d at 902. Commentators have generally criticized the reasoning
in Garber and have advocated the solution adopted by the Yoder court. See Casad,
supra note 7, at 427 n.17. See generally 24 VAND. L. REV. 808 (1971).
15. Garber, 410 P.2d at 901.
16. Since the Beiler and Garber decisions, the United States Supreme Court has in-
dicated a general disapproval of the use of labels such as parens patriae to justify the
state's supervision of the activities of minors, especially when there is a danger of inter-
ference with procedural constitutional rights. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). But see
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In holding that juveniles were not enti-
tled to trial by jury, the McKeiver Court indicated that parens patriae may be the proper
basis for denying a claim of constitutional rights if the court deems the circumstances
appropriate to do so. Although the Court did not rely explicitly on the state's role as
parens patriae, the majority rejected the argument which equates juvenile proceedings
with criminal trials on the grounds that this contention ignores the "paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates." Id. at 550.
17. See Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158 (1943). In Prince the Supreme
Court observed that neither religious liberty nor rights of parenthood are beyond limita-
tion.
18. 389 U.S. 51 (1967). No opinion was filed, and it is not clear why the Supreme
Court refused to hear the appeal. Three justices dissented from the dismissal: Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas indicated that there was probable jurisdic-
tion and the appeal should have been heard.
19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a critical analysis of the Garber decision in light of
Sherbert see Casad, supra note 7. See also note 22, infra.
20. Sherbert and Yoder both clearly uphold the right to act according to one's reli-
gious beliefs, destroying the distinction between conduct and belief. See note 7, supra.
21. When state action indirectly restrains the free exercise of religion, such action
must be justified by a compelling state interest. "It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensi-
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The Yoder court followed the approach of the Supreme Court in
Sherbert. First, the court decided that the state compulsory education
requirements imposed a burden on the free exercise of religion by the
defendants. The judges acquainted themselves with the religious phi-
losophy of the Old Order Amish and found that because of their rejec-
tion of the materialism of the larger society, and their belief that in-
volvement with the "Satanic world" prevents salvation and destroys
their highly valued individualism, compulsory education not only in-
fringed upon their right to worship, but also was completely repulsive
to the Amish lifestyle.22
Second, as in Sherbert, the Yoder court held that the state had not
shown a compelling state interest which justified subordination of reli-
gious freedom. The court stated that it is not enough to show that a
regulation has a direct relation to a public goal; 23 there are constitu-
tional limitations on the doctrine of parens patriae.24 The majority
concluded that the objectives of compulsory education were not suffi-
cient to justify the burden placed upon the free exercise of the Amish
religion.
In so holding, the Wisconsin court rejected the argument that the
exemption of religious sects from compulsory attendance violates the
establishment clause of the first amendment. 25 The opinion does not
tive constitutional area, '[o] nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occassion for permissible limitation.' " Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406, citing
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Thus, a compelling state interest exists only
when the social interest served by the state action which incidentally burdens the indi-
vidual's free exercise clearly outweighs the combined value of the individual interests
which are burdened and the social interest in the preservation of the constitutional rights
claimed by the individual. Cf. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Atnend-
,nent, 72 YALE E.J. 877, 912 (1963). Although the phrase "weighing of conflicting in-
terests" does not appear in Sherbert, it is expressly used in Yoder to describe the court's
reasoning process. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
The "compelling interest" test has been used in other first amendment areas. See
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (interest of members of labor union in
receiving legal representation outweighed state's interest in protecting against conflict
of interests); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (state showed no compelling
interest justifying statutory burden on right to associate according to political beliefs).
22. The Old Order Amish Church is a conservative sect, numbering about 50,000 in
membership. 24 VAND. L. REV. 808 n.2 (1971).
For information on the philosophy of the Amish people and their culture which has
given rise to the constitutional issues involved in Yoder see: Casad, supra note 7; J.
HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (1963); W. SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS (1962);
E. SM ITH, THE AMISH PEOPLE (1958); 53 VA. L. REV. 925 (1967). See also 35 WASH.
L. REV. 151 (1960).
23. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 543.
24. See note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
25. For a recent discussion of religious freedom and the establishment clause see
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deny that by excusing the Amish children from attending school the
state will in effect assist the Amish religion to some degree. However,
according to theYoder court, this accommodation of the Amish religion
is not an establishment of that religion, but rather only a recognition
of the tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the first amendment.26
Bartholomew, Religion and the Public Schools, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1078 (1967); Com-
ment, Church-State-Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey---1964-66, 41
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 681 (1966).
For a thorough analysis of the historical development of the establishment clause see
Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395 (1966). Sky relates the Bible-reading and the school prayer
decisions to the debates during the constitutional convention and concludes:
The full historical significance of that constitutional enigma [the establishment
clause] eludes us, and the intent of the framers who drafted it cannot therefore be
circumscribed with scientific precision. There is, however, a sufficient historical
evidence to justify the conclusion that by their use of the phrase "establishment of
religion" the framers meant more than "an established church" and that they ex-
pected the clause to reach all vestiges of governmentally supported religion, in-
cluding officially prescribed forms of worship and religious exercises.
Id. at 1463.
Arguably, allowing the Amish to be exempt from the compulsory education statute
would constitute an establishment of religion. Yet, if the exemption is denied, to require
the Amish children to attend public high school would infringe their freedom of religion.
The conflict between constitutional freedoms arises from the constitution itself. In
Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1969), which upheld the constitutionality of
the tax exemption of church property, the Court stressed the desirable rule of flexible
neutrality when dealing with conflicts between government and religion. The court con-
cluded that the first amendment ". . . will not tolerate either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion." Id. at 669. The majority appeared
to recognize the futility of multiple forms of expression of the same conflict, concluding
that it is all a matter of relativity:
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establish-
ing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must
also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government intan-
glement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation
of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion.
Elimination of the exemption would tend to expand the involvement of govern-
ment by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and the direct confrontation and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes.
Id. at 674 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that tax exemption creates only a
minimal and remote involvement between church and state.
See also Dixon, Religion, Schools and the Open Society: A Socio-Constitutional Is-
sue, 13 J. PUB. LAW 267 (1964). In his discussion of the Sherbert decision Dixon con-
densed the expressions for interaction between conflicting first amendment interests
into the adversary form, "free exercise v. establishment." Id. at 301.
26. The tension between freedom of religion, the establishment clause and the police
power of the state is complicated by provisions found in many state constitutions which
provide for uniform educational opportunities. See WASH. CONST. art. IX § 1, Preamble:
It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of
all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on ac-
count of race, color, caste, or sex.
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The significance of Yoder is that it resolves the conflict between the
free exercise clause and compulsory education statutes by a true bal-
ancing, or weighing, of interests. Before Sherbert, a state could prevail
in a free exercise case by demonstrating that state regulation served a
rational objective. 27 In Garber, for example, the court found it unnec-
essary to consider the effect of compulsory education upon the Amish
people because it had concluded that education was a rational state
interest. 28 Prior to Yoder and Garber, however, the Court in Sherbert
had held that the interests of both the state and the individual should
be probed more deeply; that these interests were to be weighed or bal-
anced accordingly, with due consideration given both to the effect of
an exemption on historical constitutional doctrine and to the more
practical effects on all parties concerned; and that an exception to a
statutory regulation was to be granted or denied only after such fac-
tors were studied and weighed.29 Others have satisfactorily examined
the interests of the Amish which should be considered in the Yoder
situation, 30 and the remainder of this note will focus on the validity of
interests which may be claimed by the state to preclude an exemption
for the Amish.
One argument assertable by the state is that the Yoder decision is
arguably contrary to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which require that equal educational opportunities be provided to all
school-age children. 31 These decisions follow the principle emphasized
in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education"3 2 that is, that education is
possibly the most important function of state and local governments: 33
27. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1943) (child labor law).
28. According to Garber, failure to comply with any reasonable requirement im-
posed by the exercise of that power to benefit the general welfare would not be excused
"in the name of religious freedom." 419 P.2d at 901.
29. See note 21, supra. A number of free exercise cases decided since Sherbert have
adopted the compelling interest test. See, e.g., In re Jenisen, 267 Minn. 136, 125
N.W.2d 588 (1963) (state failed to establish that interest in obtaining competent jurors
would be jeopardized by exempting those opposed to jury duty for religious reasons);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1964) (state's interest
not sufficiently compelling to prohibit the use of peyote, a non-addictive hallucinatory
drug, where its use was essential to the defendants' religious ritual).
30. See Casad, supra note 7. See also Note, The Right Not to be Modern Men: The
Ainsh and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925 (1967); Galanter, Religious
Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 236.
3 1. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Griffin v. Prince Edward School Board, 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. ld. at 493.
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Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of edu-
cation to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a prin-
cipal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in pre-
paring him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms.
Yet, by dxamining the factors considered by the Court in Brown, it
can be shown that State v. Yoder does not conflict with the principles
expressed above.34
First, the appellants in Brown and the appellants in Yoder sought
different kinds of relief. The parents of the children in Brown asked
for equal treatment, especially in education, basing their claims upon
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Yoder and
the other Amish parents, however, had no objections to the equality
of the state's educational opportunities. Instead, they demanded that
those opportunities not be forced upon them contrary to the tenets of
their religion and philosophy of life.35
Second, the argument that only compulsory school attendance can
promote a "democratic society" and "basic public responsibilities"
cannot be asserted with such confidence when the Old Order Amish
are involved. 36 Their strong belief in passivity counters any argument
advanced in support of compulsory education as a desirable institu-
34. The dissent in Yoder insisted that "[e] ducation has been a prime and compel-
ling interest of this state since its very beginning." 182 N.W.2d at 549. The majority
acknowledged the need for education to build public responsibility, good citizenship
and cultural values but found "compelling merit" in the petitioners' contentions that
their education "produces as good a product as two additional years' compulsory high
school education does." In so finding, the majority observed that Amish ". . . cultural
values are different, that their life requires no professional training and that two years of
high school education does not help Amish children to adjust normally to their Amish
environment." Id. at 543.
35. The Amish parents did not contend that the compulsory education statute or
other regulatory provision was an unreasonable exercise of state power. They contended
that, as applied to them, it violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. at
545.
36. Id. at 543.
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tion for preparation for military service. Without derogating the ideals
of good citizenship, democracy and public responsibility, the Amish
reject many of the cultural values which public school systems impose
upon children. Assuming the Amish child accepts his parents' way of
life and religious ideals, he has little need for professional training.37
Finally, by allowing the Amish to be exempt from the compulsory
education statutes, the educational objectives of these laws are not en-
tirely lost. The Amish children are given the best education the com-
munity can afford, omitting only those academic subjects totally re-
pulsive to the Amish ideology. The Yoder court seemingly assumed,
or at least did not feel the state had rebutted the possibility, that the
Amish are able to provide an acceptable alternative to public educa-
tion. 38 Therefore, the state cannot rely on Brown or other expressions
of the necessity of equality in education to deny religious exemptions
from state compulsory education laws, especially when the exemption
can be justified by the nature of the people concerned.
A second state interest which might be advanced to support the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin compulsory education law as ap-
plied to the Amish is that exempting them may disrupt the entire regu-
latory scheme, may entail substantial expense, or may place an undue
burden on the administration of the compulsory education program.
However, the United States Supreme Court has recently been unrecep-
tive when allegations of a compelling state interest were based on
administrative convenience or fiscal savings. The Court agreed with
the appellants in Sherbert v. Verner that granting an exemption from
the unemployment compensation rule for Saturday worshippers did
not completely prevent uniform application of the Commission's
rules. 39 Similarly, allowing Amish children of high school age to be
exempt from statutory requirements would not disrupt the overall
uniformity of a state's educational scheme.
37. See note 22 and accompanying text, supra.
38. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 543.
39. The Sherbert Court found that no objection had been raised as to the possibility
of abuse of the state's permissiveness by "unscrupulous claimants feigning religious
objections" and felt that the state court should pass on that "state interest" if and when it
is raised. Further, the Court held:
[E] yen if the possibility of a spurious claim did threaten to dilute the [compen-
sation] fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incum-
bent upon [the Employment Security Commission] to demonstrate that no alter-
native forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights.
374 U.S. at 407.
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First, the exemption provided in Yoder involves Amish children
only40 and only Amish children of secondary school age. Excusing a
small number of children should not seriously disrupt an educational
program. 41 Also, it is unlikely that the Yoder decision will cause the
state to be flooded by a multitude of requests for exemption from the
state's educational program. The position of the Amish is isolated and
unique and cannot, in all probability, be claimed by other minority
groups. Many groups that do not desire integration into society may
be able to meet the state educational requirements by sending their
children to private schools.42
Even if the Yoder decision should result in a deluge of requests for
educational exemptions, this is not sufficient reason to overrule the
state court's conclusion. The cost of determining who is entitled to an
exemption is not a compelling interest that can justify deprivation of
constitutional rights,4 3 nor is the need for a simple procedure for elim-
inating insincere applicants.44 Only if the state is unable to distinguish
40. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 540. Five justices concurred in the opinion only as ap-
plied to the Amish. Both the majority and the concurring opinions included the reserva-
tion to reexamine the question if the exception jeopardized the effectiveness of the com-
pulsory education law. Id. at 547.
For cases in areas other than education dealing with requests for exemptions, see
People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1967); Leary v. U.S.,
383 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1967) (marijuana is not essential to practice of Hindu religion
and state has compelling interest in protecting public safety, peace and order); and State
v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (compelling state interest test not ap-
plied). For an examination of the drug exemption cases, see Casad, supra note 7, at 430,
431.
41. According to one commentator, Amish are found in most states, with large
communities in Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. The Old Order
Amish is the most conservative sect, numbering about 50,000. See-24 VAND. L. REV. at
808 n.2 (1971).
If the Amish were compelled to send their children to public school, it is conceivable
that rural areas would experience a problem of shortage of facilities and instructors.
42. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state law requiring every
person having custody of a school-age child to send the child to public school in the dis-
trict where he resides held invalid as an unreasonable interference with the liberty of
parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children). For a casenote which
discusses what is an "approved" private school see 35 WASH. L. REV. 151 (1960).
43. The Supreme Court has often stressed that the saving of money does not justify
infringement of constitutional rights. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(avoidance of expense does not justify invasion of welfare recipients' right to equal pro-
tection of the laws); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (increase in fiscal and ad-
ministrative burden does not justify termination of AFDC aid without prior notice or
hearing); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (inability to pay court fees and
csts to bring divorce action does not justify depriving indigents of their right to due
process of law).
44. In Yoder the sincerity of the defendants was unquestioned and therefore "stipu-
lated to" in the record. Yet, even in situations where it will be more difficult for admin-
339
Washington Law Review
between insincere and sincere applicants by any feasible means should
religious exemptions be denied for administrative reasons. It is
doubtful that the state will have great difficulty in determining which
groups or individuals, if any, are entitled to a religious exemption
under Yoder.
The most appealing argument the state might make for enforcing
the compulsory education statute is based on the welfare of the child.
What chance for success will the Amish youth have if he is denied a
public high school education and later decides to leave the community
to compete in the larger society? Without that education, that child
conceivably will not be able to cope with the demands of the outside
world.45 Further, if the exemption is upheld, the Amish youth will not
be introduced to any elements of life outside the limited experiences of
his Amish upbringing. Yoder would deny him the chance to "sample"
the alternative environment.
To resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court must first accept the
proposition that the Amish will ultimately lose something; the Amish
child will lose the fruits of a well-rounded education, or the Amish
parents will lose the freedom to rear their children according to the
tenets of their religion. The Amish child, practically speaking, will
lose his freedom of choice in any event, for whether or not he will re-
ceive a public education and whether or not he will be able to retain
his uncomplicated religious faith are decisions that will be made for
him, before he reaches majority.
No formal study has been discovered which determines the exact
number or percentage of children who leave the Amish community
upon reaching majority. Yet, regardless of the number, it is possible
that those Amish children who ultimately leave the community may
make the transition out of the Amish community more easily than
those who have been compelled to learn conventional social values are
able to re-enter the narrowly focused Amish lifestyle.
istrative bodies to determine whether an individual is a sincere believer, Supreme Court
opinions indicate that the desire for simple administrative procedure does not justify
invasion of constitutional rights. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (desire
to decrease number of welfare applicants does not justify a simple procedure which in-
terferes with the rights of qualified welfare applicants); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (increase in administrative burden does not justify curtailing due process rights);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968) (exemption does not present administrative
problem of such magnitude that entire statutory scheme rendered unworkable).
45. See Casad, supra note 7, at 433, 434 nn. 47 & 51. Casad concludes that the
number of Amish "defecters" is indeterminable. Cf. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 549.
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The Wisconsin court assumed that the Amish received an education
adequate to meet the demands of adult life in the community. Relying
on the Supreme Court's recent deflation of the doctrine of parens pa-
triae as a justification for deprivation of constitutional rights,46 the
Yoder court concluded that the state cannot use this protective ra-
tionale to abridge the natural parents' right to rear and teach their
children according to their religion. Otherwise, the state destroys the
child's choice upon reaching majority to choose his religion for him-
self.47
The Yoder court did not deal with the question of those who leave.
It is submitted, however, that the court correctly concluded that the
doctrine of parens patriae is not applicable in this setting. The doc-
trine should be invoked to protect a child when the interests of the
state can be achieved only by governmental regulation and not by al-
ternative means. Unlike the areas of child labor and child health,48
46. See note 16, supra.
47. The compulsory education cases involve the rights of two classes: the parents
and the children. The cases of concern herein have involved criminal prosecutions of
parents for non-compliance by a member or members of a religious faith. See note 1
and accompanying text, supra. Since the children are not being sued as "truants," the
court did not reach the question whether they have an independent right to freely exer-
cise their religion. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d at 542.
Aside from that question, it should be noted that in many cases it is doubtful whether
the children want to go to public school. See State ex rel. Shoreline School District v.
Superior Court, 55 Wn.2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied 363 U.S. 814 (1960)
(parents withdrew child who was ridiculed at public school because of her noncon-
formity regarding eating, dancing and music; held, state's exercise of authority was
proper). In Shoreline, Judge Hunter dissented on the ground that the compulsory school
attendance law does not "contemplate that every child of compulsory school age must
come within the operation of the statute." 55 Wn.2d at 188, 346 P.2d at 1005-06. Judge
Hunter did not examine the merits of the religious tenets but grounded his dissent in
terms of what was best for the welfare of the child.
There do not seem to be any cases which deal with the problem arising if the child de-
sires to go to public school and his parents refuse to allow him to attend. If this conflict
has been present in any of the Amish cases, the court has not found that it is a serious
problem.
48. See Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158 (1943). See also Cude v. State, 237
Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) (religious beliefs afford parents no legal right to pre-
vent vaccination of children); accord, Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 308
Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
In Prince, a guardian had given her minor ward religious literature to distribute in
the streets. The court held that enforcement of the Massachusetts child labor law was not
violative of freedom of religion nor a denial of equal protection of the laws. The
opinion points out that the power of the state to control the conduct of children is
broader than its power over adults. 321 U.S. at 170. See note 17 and accompanying
text, supra.
The Prince case can easily be distinguished from the Yoder issues. Prince was decided
when the belief-conduct distinction reigned, and reiterated the conclusion that the prac-
tice of a belief can be controlled through police powers of the state to protect the safety
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where state interference with parental prerogatives may at times be
necessary to protect the welfare of both the child and society, the state
can achieve the aims of compulsory education without forcing the
Amish to attend public schools or comparable private institutions.
For example, the standards of Amish education could be scrutinized
and the capability of the teachers examined by the state board of edu-
cation and raised to a level more consistent with the state's educa-
tional standards. 49 The curriculum could also be analyzed and ex-
panded to include all facets of public education except those so repul-
sive to the Amish philosophy as to infringe upon their religious beliefs.
In this way, the objectives of compulsory education could be safe-
guarded while, at the same time, the child who might leave the Amish
community would be protected. Moreover, the Amish would not be re-
strained in the exercise of their religious beliefs. Society's real concern
should be with those Amish children who may wish to retain their her-
itage and with their parents who want the opportunity to offer it to
their descendants. The first amendment demands at least an attempt
to protect that freedom.
of its citizens. See 24 VAND. L. REV. 808, 810 (1971). The Prince court did not weigh the
interests of the state against the interests of the parent and child. Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1968), announced a new test which requires balancing. See note 21, supra.
Thus, Yoder was properly decided according to the Sherbert test rather than regressing
to the unsatisfactory reasoning of Prince.
49. For a solution proposed by a state legislature see notes 10 and 12 supra. See
also 35 WASH. L. REV. 151 (1960); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 1369 (1950).
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